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THE STATUS OF THE COLLECTIVE LABOR 
AGREEMENT IN FRANCE 
Robert ]. Nye* 
655 
T HE collective labor agreement has a peculiar status in free or quasi-free industrial economies. Theorists have attempted 
to define this status in terms of long-accepted concepts, but the re-
sults of their efforts have constituted merely new grounds for dis-
agreement and controversy. Essentially, the debates have been 
predicated on the idea that the collective agreement has the 
characteristics and implications of one of two concepts, or that 
the collective agreement may be characterized by some combina-
tion of these two concepts, that is, (1) the true contract, and 
(2) the legislative regulation. Most agree that neither concept in 
itself can account for the accepted legal and social effects of the 
collective agreement, and they therefore conclude that the agree-
ment partakes of some of the characteristics of both contract and 
law.1 But the more difficult problem is to what extent the re-
spective concepts can and do assist in a proper definition. 
However the collective labor agreement is conceptually de-
fined, its effect on industrial relations, the public and the state 
has been ever-widening. In one sense it may be characterized as a 
constitution for the government of the industrial community, the 
result of the exercise of a delegated legislative authority, but limited 
in scope and control by legislative standards. In this sense the agree-
ment is similar to a state constitution, enacted in accordance with the 
principles and limited in turn by the standards of the federal 
constitution. 
Basically the same in all nations, the collective agreement is 
subject to various requirements of form and scope in the different 
nations. This paper is intended to outline in historical perspective 
the statutory, judicial, administrative and social developments 
which have made the collective agreement an indispensable ac-
cessory to legislative and judicial regulation in France. 
• Member, Illinois bar; B.A. 1953, University of Chicago; J.D. 1954, DePaul Univer-
sity; LL.M. 1955, New York University.-Ed. 
1 For an interesting examination of French theories to explain the legal basis of the 
collective agreement, see Pirou, "The Theory of the Collective Labour Contract in France," 
5 INT. LAB. R.Ev. 35 (1922). 
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THE AcT OF MARCH 21, 1884: 
FREEDOM OF AssoCIATION 
Recognition of the legal efficacy of a collective agreement 
necessitates the pre-recognition of groups and associations, informal 
or formal, which are authorized to conclude valid agreements and 
enforce them by appeal to judicial sanction. This development 
occurred in France in 1884 as the result of a twenty-year trend.2 
The Act of March 21, 18843 removed the previous disabilities of 
"industrial associations or societies"4 and provided (§ 2) that they 
"may be formed freely without Government authorization." 
This "Magna Charta" of industrial organization" did not only 
remove the previous criminal sanctions attached to unauthorized 
association; it gave industrial associations a new and precious 
legal status. Among the new perquisites were the right in a 
collective capacity to sue and be sued, the right to acquire property 
by gift or by bargain, and the right to administer special funds 
_for mutual assistance and pensions.6 The right to enter into 
contracts under its own corporate signature was, of course, of 
enormous importance, and this provision presaged future legisla-
tive concern with the collective labor agreement itself. 
2 See, for a most complete explanation of the history of trade union legislation, the 
trade union movement, and the social, economic and political developments which con-
curred to persuade the 1884 legislative action, 2 FREEDOM OF AssocIATION 87-99 [I.L.O., 
Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. 
3 As amended by the Act of March 12, 1920, Bul. Min. Trav. 1920, p. 33 [I.L.O., 
Legis. Ser., 1920, France 8], as repealed and reenacted as consolidated in the Act to Con-
solidate Certain Labor Laws (Code of Labor and Social Welfare, Book Ill), dated Feb. 25, 
1927, J. Off. (March 1, 1927) No. 50, p. 2483 [I.L.O. Legis. Ser., 1927, France 3]. 
4 SEE FREEDoM OF AssoCIATION [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Rela-
tions), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. French statutory history on industrial associations is out-
lined in Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 215 at 216 (1952): 
"Present day French labor law traces its legislative development at least as far back 
as 1791 when the Assembly of the Revolutionary period enacted two statutes, the first of 
which abolished the guilds which had exercised a monopolistic control over industry, and 
the second of which forbade the organization of workers. Both of these measures were 
consistent with the individualistic spirit of the French Revolution, which placed strong 
emphasis upon the liberty of the individual and construed it to extend to the 'liberty to 
work.' The French Penal Code of 1810 also contained an article prohibiting the concert of 
action of workers aimed at the improvement of working conditions. A reversal of this 
legislative trend began in 1864, when a statute was enacted limiting the application of 
the Penal Code provision just mentioned, and impliedly recognizing the right of workers 
to organize for mutual self-improvement for limited purposes. In 1884, the remaining pro-
visions of the Penal Code restricting the rights of organization were removed, and unions 
were recognized as legal personalities with some restrictions. . . ." 
5 See note, I INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LEGAL DECISIONS ON LABOR LAw, 1925, at 90 
(I.L.O., Geneva, 1926), where the editor, while applauding the new status, deprecates 
repeal of article 416 of the Penal Code as a sanction of the "legality of victimization." 
6 Act of March 21, 1884, as amended by Act of March 12, 1920, §5. 
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But it was not only individual organizations which achieved 
legislative recognition. The act provided legal status for asso-
ciations of industrial associations (i.e., federations of industrial 
organizations), and entrusted these bodies, too, with all the rights 
and duties of their constituent member associations.7 In France, 
as in the United States, we find that this kind of positive legisla-
tive mandate became the justification if not the cause of the 
growth of tremendous federations of industrial associations. And 
it is recognized that in France, if not in the United States, it is 
these tremendous federations which define the labor policies 
and goals to be pursued through collective bargaining and effected 
through the collective contract. 
It would be misleading to stop here and leave the impression 
that industrial organizations were subjected to no restriction by 
the act here described. Restrictions do exist, but they are mostly 
of formal, rather than substantive, consequence. What papers 
must be filed and where, who may be members of an industrial 
association and who.may manage or administer its functions, with 
what rights and subsisting duties is a member who withdraws from 
the association invested: these are but restrictions of form. There 
is but one really important restriction which may be characterized 
as substantive: "Industrial associations shall have no other pur-
pose than that of studying and defending economic, industrial, 
commercial, and agricultural interests. "8 At first glance one may 
feel hard put to find any other purpose toward which an in-
dustrial organization might turn its efforts. But there is one. A 
purpose to exercise political power is prohibited, and one need 
not think long before it is realized that the exercise of political 
power by a militant organization whose membership may number 
into the millions constitutes an ovenvhelming danger to any state. 
Happily, although the largest industrial federation in France 
(the Confederation generale du Travail) started out with an 
orientation which was at least in part political, in 1906 the prin-
ciple of political neutrality was adopted. Due not entirely to 
the statutory restriction above described, but to a great extent 
demanded by an explosive internal situation, a conference at 
Amiens resulted in an important declaration: 
"The Federal Congress of Amiens approves Article 2 of the 
constitution of the C.G.T., which reads as follows: 
"'The C.G.T. stands apart from all political schools of 
7 Id., §6. 
8 Id., §3. 
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thought and includes all workers consciously taking part in the 
struggle to abolish the wage-earning system and the em-
ployers.' 
"The Congress considers that this declaration involves the 
recognition of class warfare which in the economic field op-
poses workers in revolt to all forms of material and moral 
victimization and oppression introduced by the capitalist 
classes against the working classes. 
"The Congress adds precision to this theoretical declara-
tion by the following remarks: 
"In its daily work trade unionism aims at co-ordinating 
the worker's efforts and improving his welfare and condition 
by the immediate introduction of steps to shorten hours of 
work, to increase wages, etc. This, however, is merely one 
side of its task. Using the general strike as a weapon, it is 
preparing the complete emancipation of the workers, con-
sidering that the trade union, nowadays a militant organiza-
tion, will in future become a group of producers engaged in 
the re-organization of society. 
"The Congress declares that this twofold policy of present 
and future action is actuated by the unsatisfactory position of 
the wage earners, which handicaps the whole of the working 
classes and which goes to show that all workers, whatever be 
their political and philosophical views, should belong to so 
essential an organization as the trade union. The Congress 
consequently recognizes the entire freedom of the individual 
trade unionist to participate, apart from his union, in any 
form of struggle which corresponds to his philosophical or pol-
litical opinions, and restricts itself to requesting him in re-
turn to abstain from introducing into the Union the opinions 
which he professes outside it; as concerns organizations the 
Congress declares that if the movement is to produce its full 
effect, all economic action should be directed against the em-
ployers, it being no concern of affiliated organizations as such 
to take any account of parties or sects which, outside them 
and side by side with them, are free to pursue their work of 
transforming society."9 
Whatever we might think today of the quoted article of the 
C.G.T. constitution and of the essentially socialistic aim described 
in this declaration, we do see that the Amiens Conference agreed 
to restrict union activities to the economic sphere. We must 
recognize the fact that French unions are politically oriented 
o See FREEDOM OF AssocIATION 108-109 [I.LO., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial 
Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. 
1957] COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS 659 
(so, too, in the main, are those of other continental countries), 
but we now know that they have subscribed to a policy of 
attaining their political ends primarily through economic con-
flict.10 
Another restriction had also been imposed on union activity. 
Whether or not the drafters of the Amiens Declaration realized 
that under the act unions could not act in a commercial capacity 
with intent to make and distribute profits among their members, 
they expressly ratified the end that the trade union "will in 
future become a group of producers engaged in the re-organiza-
tion of society." The courts, however, interfered.11 Under the 
10 The courts, too, have had something to say about political methods of attaining 
union institutional goals: Ministere public v. Leretour, Trib. civ. Seine Uan. 2, 1935) 
D.H. 1935.127, and Ministere public v. Ligue des objecteurs de conscience, Trib. civ. Seine 
(Oct. 17, 1934) D.H. 1934.596; Sem. jur. 1935.117, in which cases it was held that an 
association formed to advocate, encourage, and organize resistance to military obligations, 
iHcluding conscription, is unlawful; Venue Gras v. Vitilio, Trib. civ. Marseille (on appeal 
from Probiviral Court) (Dec. 20, 1929) Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.426; Sem. jur. 1930.622 [English 
translation: I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 105-107], affd. Cass. civ. (Oct. 29, 1930) Gaz. 
Pal. 1930.2.848) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 107], holding that a worker who takes 
part in a day's stoppage ordered by his trade union as an anti-war demonstration, without 
his employer's permission, may be dismissed without customary notice, the contract for 
hire of services being already broken by his act in participating in a strike for political 
purposes; Angevin v. Dubois, Cons. Prud'h. Seine, (Sept. 28, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1927.2.583, 
where the Justice of the Peace said: "This strike was quite unconnected with any corpo-
rate or occupational need, and its sole object was a demonstration of sympathy with Sacco 
and Vanzetti. In these circumstances, we must hold that the right to strike was wrongfully 
exercised and that [the] workers abruptly broke their contract of employment. . . . 
[A] strike which is not directed solely to corporate and trade ends is a breach of the 
contract of employment and justifies a claim by the employer for damages." Dr. Ricklin 
v. Syndicat medical de Mulhouse et des environs, App. Colmar Uuly 15, 1924) Rec. jur. 
d'Alsace-Lorraine (Feb.-March 1925) S. somm. 1925.2005, where it was held that a pro-
fessional association (medical organization) cannot for political motives or on the ground 
of conflict of opinions, refuse to admit a French citizen among its members or order his 
exclusion. Reversed, Cass. civ. (March 14, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1927.1.599, and on rehearing, 
App. Colmar (Feb. 7, 1928) Gaz. Pal. 1928.1.561, on grounds that a medical association 
does not exceed its rights in making the admission of new members dependent on certain 
conditions which are in themselves justified, such (in the case of an association located 
in Alsace) as the candidate's frank, sincere, and unreserved adherence to the French insti-
tutions restored by the Treaty· of Versailles. [Under French law, associations other than 
trade unions enjoy wide latitude in excluding members, with political considerations in 
no way prohibited.] But, as to the duty of professional associations to confine them-
selves to the defense of professional interests and to refrain from an interference in 
political matters, see Cass. civ. (Nov. 16, 1914) D. 1917.1.61. For other cases restraining 
union political machinations, see cases cited in FREEDOM OF AssoCIATION 129-130 [I.L.O. 
Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. 
11 See, e.g.: Procureur de Ia Republique v. Leretour, Trib. civ. Seine Uan. 2, 1935) 
D.H. 1935.127; Ministere public v. La Ligue des objecteurs de conscience, Trib. civ. Seine 
(Oct. 17, 1934) D.H. 1934.596; Sem. jur. 1935.117; Gorgeon v. Thomas d'Hoste, Daudier 
et al., Trib. civ. Nantes (judging as a commercial court) Uune 15, 1934) D.H. 1934.503, 
holding that associations registered under the Act of July I, 1901 (which includes unions 
but expressly disavows affecting the special laws governing industrial associations) cannot 
be regarded as commercial companies, even though they are sometimes obliged, in order to 
achieve their ends, to engage in commercial operations although such operations are 
not carried on for purposes of gain, and profits are not to be distributed among the 
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act,12 the legislative policy seems to be that there can be no parti-
tion of union assets among the members. If this is true, and the 
judges seem to agree, neither can profits gained from the use of 
those assets be so distributed. And this interpretation was ex-
pressly reaffirmed in section 16 of the Act of February 25, 1927.13 
THE AcT OF MARCH 25, 1919: 
COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS 
The Act Respecting Collective Labor Agreements of March 
25, 1919,14 confirmed the validity of collective agreements negoti-
ated by industrial associations with employers or employer asso-
ciations. This was the first French legislation to define the collec-
tive contract and provide formal and substantive requirements 
for its valid conclusion. The term "confirmed" is justified, for 
the courts had previously been forced to recognize the validity 
of collective contracts. The right to contract for the promotion 
and defense of collective interests, expressed in the Act of 1884, 
required such a decision. In a most notable case15 the Court of 
Cassation affirmed the legal nature of collective agreements con-
cluded by industrial associations, and their right to take legal 
action "in order to assure the protection of the collective interests 
of the trade represented as a whole by the association."16 
French trade union leaders (Syndicalists) had, at first, ab-
horred the idea of collective bargaining as a mode of action to 
achieve their ends. However, after World War I their attitude 
changed and they accepted with enthusiasm the new method. 
Their acceptance, associated still with a political flavor, however, 
was expressed in a statement made at the Congress of the C.G.T. 
held in Lyon in 1919: 
"It would be a profound error to see in collective agreements 
a form of collaboration [between employers and unions]. The 
collective agreements whether they cover a plant, an area or a 
nation-wide occupation have transformative values, because 
members. See, also, discussion in FREEDOM OF AssocIATION 130 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, 
Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. 
12 Act of March 21, 1884, as amended, §7, 1f3; Act to Consolidate Certain Labor Laws, 
dated February 25, 1927, §9. 
13 Act to Consolidate Certain Labor Laws (Code of Labor and Social Welfare, Book 
III), J. Off. (March l, 1927) No. 50, p. 2483 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1927, France 3]. 
14 Bul. Min. Trav. XXVI, 74• [I.L.O. (Basle) Bul. vol. XIV (1919) pp. 41-47, France l]. 
15 Cass. reun. (April 5, 1913) (D. 1914.1.65). 
16 See, for an explanation of this extra-legal (i.e., without express statutory authoriza-
tion) development, FREEDO:I{ OF ASSOCIATION 149-150 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A 
(Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. 
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they limit the authority of the employers, because they reduce 
the relations between employers and employees to a bargain 
which encourages the effort without dulling the energy, since 
the worker has thus the satisfaction of reducing the employers' 
absolutism by introducing into the workshop or plant the 
control of a power not subject to exploitation by the em-
ployer, of a force of emancipation: the union."17 
One writer has concluded that the legislative intent behind en-
actment of the Act of 1919 was more an effort to reduce union 
political orientation than a recognition of changing legal and 
social concepts: "By establishing the legal basis of collective 
agreements, the conservative majority of the Chamber elected 
in 1919 hoped to direct the energies of French syndicalism into 
new, less political, and less revolutionary channels."18 
Whatever the pressures which convinced the French legislature 
to bring forth the act, it must certainly be characterized as a 
logical conclusion to a series of legal, social and political events. 
The act codified the essence of rules which had emerged in ju-
dicial decisions, providing a statutory basis for collective agree-
ments, but it also maintained the theory of contractual strictness. 
Collective agreements were negotiated without governmental 
intervention, and were binding only on the parties signatory 
thereto. One important result of the strictly contractual nature 
of agreements governed by the provisions of this act was that: 
"[I] t was possible for heads of undertakings who were not 
affiliated to employers' associations to evade the obligations 
accepted by the associations, even when the associations were 
the most representative ones in the trade concerned. It was 
therefore not unnatural that some employers hesitated to bind 
themselves to certain conditions of employment which might 
place them at a disadvantage as compared with competitors 
who were less interested in improving the conditions of their 
workers."19 
And it was found as a fact that in the period between the end of 
World War I and the date of the next revision of the law relating 
to collective agreements, in 1936, there was a remarkable con-
trast between the degree of legislative concern to promote collec-
17 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 
237 (1951). 
1s Ibid. 
19 Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. REv. 1 at 2 
(1938). Thus, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. REv. 
236 at 237 (1951), states: "As far as immediate effects are concerned, therefore, the law 
of 1919 was of little consequence ... :• 
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tive agreements and the extent of practical application and adop-
tion of collective agreements.20 
During the years immediately following its enactment, the 
courts were presented with a variety of issues relating to the 
nature and extent of the provisions of the Act of 1919. One 
question which arose was whether there were collective agree-
ments which are not regulated by the act. Reacting in the af-
firmative, the Civil Tribunal of St. Etienne21 held that a contract 
fixing the scale of wages, and entered into between an association 
"whose object jt is not to group in a trade union the workmen 
belonging to it" and workmen, some of whom were members 
of this association, and some not, does not constitute a collective 
agreement for work within the meaning of the act. In that case 
the contract was entered into for a period of eighteen years. Under 
the act a collective contract could not be made for a definite 
period exceeding five years. Then, too, a member of an associa-
tion who has so contracted with the association cannot release 
himself from the contract by withdrawing from membership. 
Under the act, a member of an industrial association can, by with-
drawing from membership, be released from the obligations of 
a collective agreement to which the association is a party. 
It seems that the court in this case had a false idea of the 
true nature of a collective agreement. The essence is not agree-
ment between an industrial organization and workmen who belong 
to it or not; a collective agreement is one entered into by a labor 
organization and an employer, employers or an association of 
employers. The writer's intent is not to argue the validity of 
the decision, but it seems strange that a court would feel bound 
to reason that "some collective contracts are not governed by 
the act respecting collective contracts," instead of reasoning that 
"this contract is not a collective contract and is therefore not 
governed by the act respecting collective contracts." The line 
of reasoning of the court has not been followed in any succeeding 
case brought to the attention of the writer, but neither is it neces-
sarily obviated by the type of reasoning followed by the Court of 
20 See, e.g., Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 
236 at 237 (1951); Report, "Collective Agreements in France," 31 INT. LAB. REv. 700 at 
704 (1935), summarizing an extensive inquiry carried out by the French National Economic 
Council. But, cf. Pirou, "The Theory of the Collective Labour Contract in France," 5 
INT. LAB. REv. 35 at 36 (1922). 
21 Syndicat general des Tisseurs de la Loire et Ia Haute-Loire v. Jamot, Merlat, and 
Armand, Trib. civ. St. Etienne, 2d Ch. (Jan. 21, 1925) D.H. 1925.281. For an English 
translation of the case, see I.L.O., Int. Survey of Legal Decisions on Labor Law, 1925, at 
109-111 (Geneva, 1926). 
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Cassation in a 1928 decision in which the nature of a collective 
agreement is defined: 
"The object of a collective agreement which is concluded 
between a group of wage-earning or salaried employees and a 
group of employers or a single employer, is to determine be-
forehand certain conditions of employment. Neither of the 
contracting parties undertakes to pay a wage to the other 
party in exchange for work promised by that party, and there 
is no bond of subordination between the parties. The agree-
ment therefore has not the characteristics of a contract for 
hire of services. . . . "22 
The thesis that it is only the contracting parties and those 
whom they represent who are bound by a collective agreement 
has been subject to limitations evolved from the very nature of 
the civil law. Historically, one of the sources of law in the 
civil law tradition has been local custom. The Act of July 19, 
1928, amending section 23 of Book I of the Labor Code, provides 
in subsection 3 of said section that "any clause in an individual 
contract or works rules fixing a period of notice less than that 
established by custom or by collective agreement shall be null and 
void in law." This provision overruled in essence the previous 
practice engaged in by the Court of Cassation by which it had 
held that provisions of a collective agreement cannot be cited 
except against the groups which are parties to them or against 
groups, employers, or employees which had adhered to them 
in the manner and within the time-limits provided by the Act of 
1919.23 If the Act of July 19, 1928 can be interpreted to mean that 
a collective agreement may contribute to create usages in matters 
of notice of discharge, and if this usage constitutes "custom" 
within the meaning of the Act of 1928, provisions of a collective 
agreement can be cited against parties not signatories to them.24 
22 Alepee v. Lang, Cass. civ. (Jan. 4, 1928) S. 1928.1.86; D.H. 1928.152 [I.L.O., Dec. 
Lab. Law, 1928, at 84], and Pastergue v. Societe fram;aise de peintures et vernis, Cass. 
civ. (March 4, 1929) S. 1929.1.267; Sem. jur. 1929.541 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 90]. 
23 See, e.g., Ruaro v. Fiori, Cass. civ. (Feb. 11, 1929) S. 1929.1.208; Sem. jur. 1929.426 
[I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 91 and 92]. 
24 With regard to works rules indicating or crystallizing consistent usage, see: Societe 
anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de Ia Gironde v. Jusseaume, Cass. civ. (June 27, 1929) 
Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.680, sub-note (a) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 81-82]; and Agius v. 
Ruaro, Cons. Prud'h. Marseille (Sept. 23, 1930) Gaz. Pal. 1930.2.981 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. 
Law, 1930, at 83-84]. 
With regard to works rules becoming a constituted and accepted usage, see: Compain 
v. Societe des Etablissements Sauter et Harle, Cass. civ. (July 31, 1930) D.H. 1930.457; 
Gaz. Pal. 1930.2.314 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 84-85], reversing a case identical 
on the facts and lower decision as a case decided by the Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 7th 
Ch. (July 20, 1929), Societe des Establissements Sauter v. Carratoni, D.H. 1929:454; Gaz. 
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But the Act of July 19, 1928 disturbs an entire theory de-
veloped by the Court of Cassation with regard to works rules: 25 
"[T]his theory treated works rules as a tacit collective agree-
ment and raised them, in pursuance of section 1134 of the 
Civil Code, to the status of contractual law between the 
parties, on the strength of a presumption or fiction of implied 
but deliberate acceptance of all the clauses of the works rules. 
The 1928 Act, on the other hand, treats works rules as a 
body of employment conditions imposed by the will of the 
employer, as opposed to regulation by collective agreements 
between employer and employed .... "26 
At the same time, however, the Court of Cassation reversed only 
one of the inferences which it had drawn from the theory of works 
rules as an implied collective agreement, namely, the binding 
nature of works rules :fixing periods of notice, and not the theory 
itself.27 
Pal. 1929.2.146 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 94-95]. The Court of Cassation held that 
acceptance of a work rule regarding notice without protest by employees of the Paris 
metal industry for many years had not the effect of abolishing a prior usage and sub-
stituting for it another usage, and that the usage arising out of acceptance of the work 
rule does not take the place of the old usage within the definition of the word "usage" 
in the Act of 1928. Accord: Decottignies v. Deberghe et Lafage, Cons. Prud'h. Seine, 
(March 9, 1929) Gaz. Pal. 1929.1.749 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 93-94]; and Societe 
• La Manufacture Ardennaise v. Briard, Trib. civ. Charleville (Dec. 24, 1929) Sem. jur. 
1929.598) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 95-96]. Contra: Mignot et Bequet v. Faure, 
Cons. Prud'h. Seine (March 7, 1931) D.H. 1931.216 [Extract of English translation, I.L.O. 
Dec. on Lab. Law, 1931, at 80-81]. But see Levan v. Societc metallurgique de l'Escaut, 
Cass. civ. Guly 28, 1931) D.H. 1931.523; Gaz. Pal., 1931.2.796, where it was held that 
when old usage in an industry within a given district fixes the period of notice to be 
observed by the parties in case of cancellation of the contract at a fortnight, the judge 
cannot set aside this usage simply by recalling that in the great majority of undertakings 
in the same industry and the same district works rules of long standing have abolished 
notice without arousing the hostility of the workers, and that this new usage must be 
established by a showing that it has been freely and generally followed, particularly in 
works where there are no works rules; and Societe Manufacture d'armes de Paris v. 
Carre, Trib. civ. Seine Gune I, 1933) D.H. 1933.421; Gaz. Pal., 1933.2.480, and Societe 
des Etablissements Sautter-Harle v. Compain, Cass. civ. (May 2, 1933) D.H. 1933.316; Gaz. 
Pal., 1933.2.101, both of which cases hold that a practice arising out of shop regulations or 
individual contracts, which do not involve the free consent of the worker, who agrees 
from ignorance or constraint to the requirements of the employer, cannot derogate from 
ancient usages, and that only a collective agreement can do that. 
25 E.g., Cass. civ. (Nov. 21, 1927) Sem. jur. 1928.45, where analogy between works 
rules, and an agreement concluded by an employer with his employees collectively, led 
the court to declare lawful and binding a clause in the works rules which exempted the 
parties from observing the periods of notice fixed by local custom. 
26 Note, I.L.O., · International Survey of Legal Decisions on Labor Law, 1929, at 
96-97 (Geneva, 1930). 
27 With regard to works rules constituting a tacit collective agreement, see: Cheyssial 
v. Bailly, Cons. Prud'h. Toulon (May 18, 1928) Sem. jur. 1928.1133 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. 
Law, 1928, at 90-91], where it was held that a clause excluding payment for overtime 
inserted in works rules was a lawful stipulation in a tacit collective agreement. Cf., 
contra, Dr. Treille v. Vigier, Trib. civ. Lyon (Nov. 16, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1928.1.240; D.H. 
1928.131; Sem. jur. 1928.301 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1928, at 88-90]. 
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In 1925, the Court of Cassation rendered a decision which has 
been cited as authority for the proposition that "a collective 
contract cannot be a bar to individual contracts freely entered 
into in a regular form."28 In reality, however, the court refused 
to hold that individual contract provisions conflicting with those 
of a collective contract are valid. The court's entire decision was 
based on the fact that "the union [ did not] indicate what breaches 
to the collective contract could be ascribed to the company." 
Prior to this decision, however, the Civil Tribunal of St. Nazaire29 
had decided that workmen and an employer who are bound by 
a collective agreement for work can alter the latter through their 
individual agreements. Whether a collective agreement con-
trols even in the presence of less favorable provisions in individ-
ual contracts of employment is an issue which must be resolved 
if the nature and status of a collective agreement is to be defined. 
But the 1925 decision of the Court of Cassation does constitute a 
positive step forward in recognizing precedence of the collective 
agreement. To the extent that the decision in that case may be 
interpreted to mean that the court refused to affirm that in-
dividual agreements can alter the terms of collective agreements, 
it has repudiated its 1910 decision that collective agreements have 
no effect on non-conforming individual contracts of employ-
ment.30 It is but reasonable that the French courts should have 
taken a step-although not a bold one-away from the strict con-
cept of contract. Although the Act of 1919 did provide for the 
effects and enforcement of collective agreements in subchapter 
IV, it did not expressly give to collective agreements the effect 
of supersedure. A close reading of the act, however, does justify 
this conclusion. 31 And it is further justified by the fact that all 
collective agreements are intended to regulate working condi-
tions, although to varying degrees. One interesting treatment 
has thus stated: "All collective agreements, in so far as they regu-
late working conditions, lay down in advance the conditions of 
employment that must form part of every individual contract of 
28 Syndicat des dessinateurs de Nantes v. Societe des ateliers de constructions de 
l'Ouest, Cass. civ. Gan. 5, 1925) Rev. Prud. 1925.75 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 108]. 
See note, I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 108. 
29 Syndicat des Metallurgistes de St. Nazaire v. Chauden et ateliers de la Loire, Trib. 
civ. St. Nazaire Guly 12, 1922) D. 1925.2.1 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 104). 
30 Cass. civ. Guly 7, 1910) 1 D.P. 201.1911. See, for a discussion of development of 
the French judicial attitude on this point, Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial 
Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 215 at 228-229 (1952). 
31 See, particularly, §§31q, 31s, 3It, 3lu. Bul. Min. Trav., XXVI, 74• [I.L.O. (Basie) 
Bul., vol. XIV (1919) pp. 41-47, France l]. 
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employment concluded between persons bound by the collective 
agreements. "32 
By 1937, however, the Court of Cassation had reached the 
point where it consistently upheld the validity of collective agree-
ments notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary in an in- · 
dividual contract of employment between an employer and an 
employee who were bound by a collective agreement. Thus, the 
clauses of a collective agreement are mandatory, and it is not per-
mitted for such persons to depart from them.33 This final step 
may have been hastened by the additional provisions inserted 
into the Act of 1919 by the Act of 1936. The latter provisions 
reinforced in another context the binding nature of collective 
agreements, and may have convinced the courts that the nature 
of a collective agreement is consistent with the idea of a regulatory 
measure.34 
THE ACT OF JUNE 24, 1936: SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION AND 
EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS35 
The Act of June 24, 1936 followed closely a conference held in 
the early part of June 1936, at which were present representatives 
82 CoLLECI'IVE AGREEMENTS 125 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Rela-
tions), ~o. 39, Geneva, 1936]. 
33 Glatigny v. Lecacher, Cass. civ. (Nov. 17, 1937) D.H. 1938.68, quashing a judgment 
which refused to grant a worker the benefit of wages laid down in a collective agreement 
on the ground that the clause of an individual agreement stipulating a lower wage was 
still in force. See, also, Societe Pharmacie centrale du Nord v. Dame Eysseric, Trib. civ. 
Seine (June 23, 1937) D.H. 1937.512 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1937, at 73], where it was 
held that an employee who has accepted a lower rate of wages is always entitled to 
require the employer to pay him the rate prescribed in the agreement, because the 
collective agreement makes any individual contractual agreement ineffective. For an excep-
tion based on the concept of force majeure, see, Grandjean v. Societe des Etablissements 
Erisol, Cass. civ. (June 17, 1937) D.H. 1937.439 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1937, at 74]. 
34 See, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 236 
at 237 (1951), where he states that the law of 1919 led to "interesting discussions about 
the legal nature of the collective agreements, which helped to prepare the second phase 
of their history. A number of jurists, led by Professor Duguit, questioned the legal 
classification of the collective agreements. They are not simple contracts, but of a 
different legal nature: they are 'actes-regles,' statutes of the profession having a character 
similar to that of public statutes. This concept made rapid progress among the labor 
lawyers and has become the predominant legal interpretation in France. It was officially 
endorsed by the legislature under the Popular Front regime of 1936 and was made the 
cornerstone of the new law adopted on June 24, 1936, as a consequence of the famous 
'Accords Matignon' of June 7, 1936." For an incisive comment on legislative and judicial 
attitudes and criteria with respect to labor legislation, see, Lambert, Pie and Garraud, 
"The Sources and the Interpretation of Labour Law in France," 14 INT. LAB. REv. I 
(July 1926). 
35 Act to Amend and Supplement Chapter IV bis of Part II of the First Book of the 
Labor Code, Entitled "Collective Agreements,'' J. Off. (June 26, 1936) No. 149, p. 6698 
[I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1936, France 7], as amended by the Decree Respecting Production of 
May 2, 1938, J. Off. (May 1, 2, 3, 1938) No. 104, p. 4951; (May 8, 1938) No. 109, p. 5266; 
(May 20, 1938) No. 119, p. 5658; Aug. 10, 1938) No. 186, p. 9458 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1938, 
France 5]. 
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of the (employer) French Confederation of Production, the 
(employee) General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.), and the 
government. As we have seen, the Act of 1919 did very little 
to promote the conclusion of collective agreements between 
labor organizations and employers. The conference was the re-
sult of recognition by industrial and governmental forces of the 
immediate necessity for mitigating the economic effects of severe 
sitdown strikes which occurred in May and June of 1936,36 and 
the more mediate but no less necessary objective of placing "the 
relations between employers and workers on a more stable foot-
ing. "37 The conference led to the Accord of Matignon (so-
named from the hotel in which the Accord was concluded) on 
June 7 and 8, 1936, signed in the presence of the Prime Minister 
by the representatives of the two confederations. 
The Matignon Agreements were, in fact, a set of rough-draft 
generalizations which were shortly thereafter incorporated by 
process of deduction and expansion in the Act of 1936. They 
recognized that workers may freely exercise the right of asso-
ciation, that workers cannot be hired, disciplined, or given work 
assignments by consideration of their belonging or not belonging 
to a union, and that a liaison system of workers' delegates must 
be instituted to relay worker grievances concerning application of 
legislation or collective agreements to the employer. But most 
important for our purpose was Article I of the Accord: "The 
employers' delegation agrees to the immediate preparation of 
collective contracts of employment." 
The Act of 1936 includes three salient features: (I) collective 
bargaining was to be by "joint committee[s] ... composed of 
representatives of the most representative industrial organizations 
of employers and employees in the branch of industry or com-
merce in question for the region under consideration, or for the 
whole territory of France if a national agreement is envisaged;"38 
(2) the requirement that certain substantive and procedural 
36 Report, "Collective Agreements in French Commerce," 59 INnus. & LAB. INFORMA-
TION 198 (I.L.O., Geneva, 1936); Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace 
in France," I AM. J. COMP. L. 215 at 217 (1952); COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 84 [I.L.O., 
Studies and Reports, Ser •. A (Industrial Relations) No. 39, Geneva, 1936]. 
37 Pouliot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. REv. I at 7 (1938). 
See, also, Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire Trades 
and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. REv. 153 at 166 (1939), where it is reported that it was not 
only employer and employee industrial associations which felt the need to stabilize 
employment relations, but that "one of the leading points on the programme of the 
new [Popular Front] Government was the encouragement of collective agreements .•.• " 
33 Act of June 24, 1936, §3Iva, ,r2. 
668 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 55 
stipulations be incorporated in the collective agreement;39 and 
(3) the concept of extension of the collective agreement to third 
parties by order of the Minister of Labor.40 Each of these three 
points effects a radical change in the status of the collective 
agreement as defined in prior French legislation. And, since 
the changes c<;>nstitute not only a difference in approach from 
earlier French law but a difference from United States law either 
in degree or in principle, several problems raised by the act will 
be examined. 
The first problem to be considered is what is a "most repre-
·sentative industrial organization"? The source of the phrase is 
generally conceded to be Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitu-
tion of the International Labor Organization, where _it is used 
to govern the appointment of employer and worker delegates to 
the Conference of the Organization.41 A decision of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice on July 31, 192242 gave very little 
assistance. With respect to the !LO provision, the only conclu-
sion which was warranted was that "all other elements being 
equal, the number of members would be decisive in determining 
the representative character of the organization."43 But labor 
organizations are as different with respect to elements other 
than size as human beings. To attempt a clarification of the 
phrase, the Minister of Labor issued a Circular on August 17, 
1936. Restating the decision of the Permanent Court, "Numbers 
are not the only test of the representative character of the organiza-
tions, but they are an important factor," the Circular went on 
to say: 
"If it is found that membership in the organization is not 
actually free, but that it was brought about by means of pres-
sure or through the influence of certain employers, the extent 
to which the union is qualified to negotiate with the employer 
concerning the occupational interests of the workers and em-
ployees is open to question. 
39 Id., §3lvc. 
40 Id., §§3lvd, 3lve, 3lvf. 
41 See, Stunnthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 !Nnus. & LAB. REL. REv. 236 
at 238 (1951); Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. REv. 
1 at 8-9 (1938). 
42 Publications, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B: Collection of 
Advisory Opinions, No. 1, July 31, 1922 (Leyden, 1922), at 19: "Numbers are not the 
only test of representative character of the organizations, but they are an important 
factor; other things being equal, the most numerous will be the most representative." 
43 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 
238 (1951). And Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire 
Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. REv. 153 at 172 (1939). 
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"In addition to the number of members, other criteria may be 
taken into account, for instance, the length of time during 
which the members have paid their contributions and the 
amount of the contribution. In view of the fact that the 
creation of occupational organizations is not subject to com-
plicated and costly legal formalities, they can be established 
with the greatest facility. Therefore, for an organization 
to be considered the most representative, it should be able to 
show, both by the amount of the contributions and the regu-
larity of payment, that there exists a bond of a certain per-
manence between the organization and its members and not 
only a fortuitous and temporary connection."44 
The minister of Labor also indicated that more than one 
organization in a particular industry or area might be the "most 
representative."45 The designation of the "most representative" 
industrial organizations is placed within the discretion of the 
Minister of Labor or his representative,46 but appeal was per-
mitted "to the Higher Arbitration Court (Cour superieure 
d'arbitrage) and, after its suspension by decree of September I, 
1939, to the Conseil d'Etat, a High Court specially dealing with 
the legality of administrative actions .... "47 It may be noted, 
in comparison, that there exists no direct judicial review of an 
NLRB certification of the bargaining representative for an 
employee unit, nor of an administrative determination of the 
"appropriate" unit to be represented by a certified representa-
tive.48 
On May 28, 1945, the Minister of Labor issued another 
Circular dealing with the same definition.49 Several new features 
44 "Definition of Representative Industrial Organizations in France," 52 INT. LAB. 
REv. 680 at 681 (1945). 
45 See Stunnthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. R.Ev. 
236 at 239 (1951), where the rationalization for this ministerial decision is restated: 
"For this interpretation . • • its advocates appealed to the 'spirit of French indi-
vidualism,' the great ideological diversity of the French workers, etc. No less important, 
it may be assumed, was the strategic need of preventing the C.G.T.-although at that 
time under strong non-Communist leadership-from obtaining a trade union monopoly 
at the expense, in particular, of the Catholic labor organization and of the Confederation 
Generale des Cadres de l'Economie Fran91ise (C.G.C.E., created in 1937) [Since 1944 
this organization has called itself C.G.C. It organizes higher and technical employees.]." 
46 Act of June 24, 1936, §3lva. 
47 Stunnthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 236 at 
239 (1951). See, for a decision by the Council of State upholding an administrative deter-
mination of "most" representativeness, DRorr SocIAL, 18th Year, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 
224-225 [Reported in English, 14 INDUS. & LAB. 196-197 (I.L.O., No. 4, Aug. 15, 1955)]. 
48E.g.: American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941); Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 
325 U.S. 697 (1945); May Dept. Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945). 
49 J. Off. Gune 28, 1945) p. 3915. 
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may be noted, however. A natural effect of World War II and 
the Occupation was to render "patriotism" a more conscious 
criterion for all positions of privilege. Thus, the new Circular 
stated that the patriotic services performed by industrial organ-
izations and their record with regard to the enforcement of 
social legislation should also be taken into account. The Circular 
said that the General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.) and the 
French Confederation of Christian Workers satisfy all the condi-
tions necessary to "most representative" status. But we must 
not conclude that only these two unions constitute the sole bar-
gaining representatives for labor in the French scheme. The 
Circular provides: "A trade union may be found to be qualified 
to represent the interests of an occupation so far as a region is 
concerned, or locally, or within an undertaking, whereas the 
federation or confederation to which it is affiliated is not qualified 
to do so at the national level." Thus, "the representative char-
acter of a trade union organization may be judged, as the case 
may require, from either the occupational or the territorial 
(whole country, district, locality, undertaking) point of view, 
and sometimes with different results. . . .''50 And the second 
Circular clarifies the meaning of the minister's original declara-
tion that "most representativeness" in a particular industry or 
area is not limited to one organization. We now see that the 
French system contemplated a concept of representation very 
similar, if not identical, to that which has developed under 
American law. Both systems subscribe to a concept of "exclu-
sive representative" for purposes of representation of the. em-
ployees in a particular unit. In France such a unit was defined 
in terms of "occupation" or "territory"; in the United States 
the unit for bargaining is defined in terms of "appropriateness.'' 
To the extent, therefore, that a labor organization in France is 
recognized as "most representative" in an appropriate "occupa-
tional-territorial" unit, it could also be recognized as the "exclu-
sive representative" for an "appropriate bargaining unit" in the 
United States. 
The Act of February 11, 195051 finally incorporated the criteria 
set out by the Minister of Labor in his several Circulars. Most 
concisely, all the criteria have been stated by one writer as: 
1. Membership; the number of members should be duly 
50 LABotm-MANAGEMENT Co-OPERATION IN FRANCE 15 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports 
(n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. 
51 Section 31/, J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; (Feb. 22, 1950) No. 46, p. 2087; 
(March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2823 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6]. 
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checked, without, however, such supervision constituting an 
infringement of freedom of association; 
2. Independence; membership must be really free and 
without any pressure or influence of the employer; works 
unions do not provide the necessary guarantees from this point 
of view; 
3. The length of time during which members have paid 
their subscriptions, regularity of payment, and the amount 
of the subscription, all circumstances which prove the exist-
ence of a permanent bond between the union and its mem-
bers and provide the union with the resources which ensure 
its independence; 
4. The experience and age of the groups, the effective-
ness and continuity of their social activi~ies, their constructive 
spirit, achievements and moral influence; 
5. Their patriotic attitude, their record under the Vichy 
regime and their loyalty in applying social legislation.52 
The legislative policy of the United States government, as 
embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,53 
provides only, in section 8 ( d), that collective bargaining is 
". . . the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract in-
corporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, 
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... " 
French policy under the Act of 1936 is to require stipulations 
with respect to a number of matters to be incorporated in the 
collective agreement. This is, in effect, to insist that the parties 
negotiate with respect to these matters. The act does not limit 
the agreement as finally concluded from incorporating stipula-
tions as to matters beyond and more favorable than those re-
quired, but the validity of a collective agreement depends mainly 
on agreement as to the specified matters. In essence, the matters 
52 LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION IN FRANCE 15 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports 
(n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. Several intermediate revisions have been analyzed in Sturm-
thal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INnus. 8c LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 240 (1950), 
and "The Question of the 'Most Representative Organizations,' " 58 INT. LAB. REv. 660 
at 661-662 (1948). These intermediate revisions were jointly issued by the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Labor on March 13, 1947 and April 8, 1948. 
53 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 62 Stat. 991, 1286 (1948), 63 
Stat. 880 (1949), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§141-197. 
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with relation to which agreement is necessary are (1) affirmation 
of employee freedom of association and opinion; (2) institution 
of elected workers' delegates; (3) minimum wages; (4) period 
of notice; (5) organization of apprenticeship; (6) grievance 
procedures; and (7) procedures for revision or amendment of the 
agreement. 
The strictly contractual theory of collective agreements lost 
ground in the Act of 1936, never to be renewed. For, in addition 
to restating in amended form the 1919 provision that industrial 
associations not parties to a collective agreement may subse-
quently adhere and become bound by it,54 the new act instituted 
a novel (for France) procedure by which collective agreements 
may be extended and "rendered binding upon all the employers 
and employees in the occupations and regions within the scope 
of the agreement .... "55 And, by 1938, the power of the Min-
ister of Labor, by order, to so extend a collective agreement had 
been exercised in several instances.56 Not long after the exten-
sion procedures of the Act of 1936 became a subject of discussion 
and inquiry, the question arose whether certain provisions of 
an agreement could be excluded from the extension and whether 
partial extension was permissible. In 1937, the National Eco-
nomic Council declared that such "partial extension" is permis-
sible. 57 The Act of 1936, then, has added to the voluntary and 
consensual type of collective agreement, another type: "[T]he 
agreement which, by virtue of Government intervention, re-
M Act of 1919, §3lj, as amended, Act of 1936, art. 2. In deciding the binding 
character of such adherence by an employer under the Act of 1919, the Cour d'appel de 
Bordeaux, in Biere v. Union bordelaise des syndicats de l'imprimerie, November 5, 1935, 
(S. 1936.2.159) held that when a manufacturer has adhered to a collective agreement 
concluded between an employers' association of which he is not a member and the 
workers' union for the occupation, the union is entitled to require its performance. It 
seems, however, that such adherence by a single employer will no longer be binding 
under the amendment introduced in the Act of 1986. Whether such adherence would 
be binding under the traditional civil' law concepts may be another question. 
55 Act of 1936, §3lvd. See, for a discussion of extension and the nature of the 
collective agreement, Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. 
REv. 1 at 10 (1938). For the sources and history of extension, see Hamburger, "The Ex-
tension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. 
R.Ev. 153 at 162 ff. (1939), and Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in 
France," 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 215 at 226 (1952). 
50 E.g., silk weaving industry, motor industry, Paris metal industry. Preliminary note, 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LEGAL DECISIONS ON LABOUR I.Aw, 1936-1937, at 110. 
57 Conseil National Economique, LEs PROBLEMES POSES PAR L'ExTENSION DES CoN-
VENTIONS CoLI.ECTIVES DU TRAVAIL, 1937, at 9. See Hamburger, "The Extension of Collec-
tive Agreements to cover Entire Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. R.Ev. 153 at 174 (1939). 
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ceives after its adoption the status of general rule applying to 
the whole occupational group and region .... "58 
Also in 1936 the French legislature enacted what has proved 
to be the basis for a third category of collective agreements. The 
Act of December 31, 1936 concerning conciliation and arbitration 
in collective labor disputes59 made provision for compulsory 
procedures to settle collective disputes which affect commerce 
or industry. Conciliation was to be attempted first, with arbitra-
tion following where the conciliation process failed. The de-
tails were to be specified by administrative decrees,60 in the ab-
sence of these details being stipulated in the collective agreement 
involved in a particular dispute. And a most spectacular change 
in concept was made by section 6, which provides: "The reasons 
for the arbitration award shall be stated, and there shall be no 
appeal against it. It shall be binding. It shall be published." 
At last a chink in the armor of civil law disavowal of the concept 
of precedent is perceived.61 Arbitrators, in the performance of 
their essentially judicial functions, were compelled to justify their 
decisions logically. Appeal to precedent is the natural effect of 
the existence of a body of reasoned decisions. And it must be 
concluded that the French legislature meant that general rules 
of industrial behavior were to be developed. That the reasons 
for the arbitration award shall be stated and that the award shall 
be published demonstrates this intent. 
But several disturbing problems arose with relation to the 
Act of December 31, 1936: (1) aggravation of disputes caused by a 
58 Preliminary note, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LEGAL DECISIONS ON LABOUR LAW, 
1936-1937, at 110. 
59 J. Off. Gan. I, 1937) No. I, p. 127 [English translation, I.L.O., Legis. Series, 1936, 
France 17]. For the considerations which led the French government to introduce a 
compulsory procedure of conciliation and arbitration, see Maurette, "A Year of 'Experi-
ment' in France: I," 36 INT. LAB. REv. I at 17-18 (1937). See, for the Acts of July 18, 
1937 [J. Off. Guly 19-20, 1937)] and January 14, 1938 [J. Off. Gan. 14, 1938); LE TEMPS, 
Jan. 14, 1938], which provided, respectively, for prolongation of certain collective agree-
ments and of the powers conferred on the government by the Act of December 31, 1936, 
and for prolongation until February 28, 1938 of the provisions of the decrees issued under 
the Acts of December 31, 1936 and July 18, 1937, 63 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 220 (1937) 
and 65 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 145 (1938). 
' 60 Decrees were issued: Decree of January 16, 1937, J. Off. Gan. 17, 1937), as amended 
by the Decree of September 18, 1937, J. Off. (Sept. 19, 1937). For a description of the 
events leading up to adoption of the act and a summary of the Decree of January 16, 
1937, see, 61 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 232 (1937). A summary of the chief amendments 
in the Decree of September 18, 1937 may be found in 64 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 211 
(1937). 
61 And Professors Lambert, Pie, and Garraud, "The Sources and the Interpretation 
of Labour Law in France," 14 INT. LAB. REv. I at 14-15 (1926), reinforce the conclusion 
that this disavowal has been merely spoken but not intended, and professed but not 
effected. 
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complicated system of conciliation by stages as set forth in the 
administrative decrees; (2) insufficient ·definition of the powers 
of arbitrators and umpires; (3) absence of the right of appeal 
from an umpire's decision attack.ea on grounds that the umpire 
was not competent to make such an award, that he exceeded his 
powers, or that the award was contrary to law; ( 4) legal effect of 
an arbitrator''s or umpire's award interpreting the provisions 
of a collective agreement or of a wage agreement; (5) absence of 
provision for revision, by arbitration, of wage clauses in collective 
agreements during the term of the agreement, when the cost-of-
living index rises dangerously. To resolve these problems the 
French legislature passed the Act of March 4, 1938.62 With re-
spect to the first problem, section 2 provided that only one at-
tempt at conciliation will be made, failure of which will be im-
mediately followed by arbitration. With respect to the second 
problem, section 9 of the act provided that arbitrators and um-
pires may not decide any points other than those set out in the 
report recording failure of conciliation, that their decisions are 
to be based on the rules of the general law in the case of disputes 
involving legal issues, and that in other collective disputes deci-
sions are to be based on equity. With respect to the third problem, 
section 13 and 14 provide for appeal to a newly constituted 
Higher Court of Arbitration (Gour superieure d'arbitrage). With 
respect to the fourth problem, section 18 provides that an award 
interpreting provisions of a collective agreement or wage agree-
ment has the same effect as a collective agreement if it is registered 
in accordance with section 31c of the Act of 1919.63 With.respect 
i:o the fifth problem, section IO provides for review of wage 
clauses when the official . cost-of-living index varies five percent 
or more from the "index number at the date nearest to the date 
on which the wages in question were fixed."64 
62 J. Off. (March 5, 1938) No. 54, p. 2570 [English translation, I.L.O., Legis. Series, 
1938, France l]. The act was supplemented by a Decree of April 20, 1938, J. Off. (April 
20 and 23, 1938); Bulletin de Ia Confederation genera.le du patronat franc;ais, Gune 15, 
1938), the substance of which is found in 67 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 362-363 (1938). 
A simplification of the Act of 1938 procedure was the object of a legislative decree of 
November 12, 1938, issued under the Emergency Powers Act of Oct. 5, 1938, a summary 
of which may be found in 68 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 364-369 (1938). 
63 One writer in 1937 felt the need for a penalty to enforce arbitration or umpire 
awards. Maurette, "A Year of 'Experiment' in France: I," 36 !NT. LAB. REv. l at 19 
(1937): "There is one p9ssible omission [in the Act of December 31, 1936]: if the decision 
of the arbitrators or the umpire is not carried out by one of the parties, no penalty can 
be enforced. • • ." The question seems to have been rendered moot, in vie,v of the 
1938 provision that such awards may be enforced ·as collective agreements. 
64 A detailed analysis of the Act of March 4, 1937 may be found in 65 INDUS. & LAB. 
INFORMATION 349 (1938). An examination of settlement procedures existing prior to the 
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WORLD WAR II EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND THE AcTS OF 
THE VICHY REGIME 
Beginning on the first day of September 1939, emergency de-
crees were issued which, inter alia, dealt with the status of the 
collective bargaining agreement and conciliation and arbitration 
procedures. The Decree of September I, 193965 suspended the 
application of laws and regulations concerning conciliation and 
arbitration, and the application of provisions concerning the re-
view of wages in collective agreements and contracts of employ-
ment. But the concept of the collective agreement as the in-
dustrial supplement to legislation was not thereby destroyed. In 
an official statement issued by the French Ministry of Labor on 
October 13, 1939,66 it was pointed out that "the state of war is 
not in itself a sufficient reason for the termination of contracts of 
employment. The war has not affected collective agreements 
concluded between employers' and workers' organizations, and, 
in the absence of supplementary agreements in the form of addi-
tional clauses, all provisons of collective agreements must be 
fully observed."67 In a statement made on October 20, 193968 to 
the Labor Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister of 
Labor assured his audience that the collective agreement system, 
which was the keystone of ·the whole French social structure, would 
be maintained subject to changes which might be required by un-
foreseen events. 69 
A Decree of October 16, 193970 suspended the working of the 
National Economic Council for the duration of the war and set 
up a Permanent Economic Committee to assume the necessary 
duties during the period of hostilities. A memorandum to the 
decree explained that the National Economic Council was not 
adapted to wartime requirements and that "a smaller permanent 
Act of December 31, 1936 may be found in CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN INDUSTRIAL 
DISPUTES, French national monograph at 170-186 [I.L.O., Studies & Reports, Ser. A 
(Industrial Relations) No. 34, Geneva, 1933]. 
65 J. Off. (Sept. 6, 1939), amended by the Decree of September 8, 1939, J. Off. (Sept. 
9, 1939), which provides that the Minister of Labor, when he thinks fit, may introduce a 
system of conciliation and arbitration applicable throughout the war. All the provisions 
of the decree are summarized in 71 INDUS. & LAB. INFOR!l{ATION 339-341 (1939). 
66 LE TE!l{PS, October 14, 1939. 
67 Note, "The War and Collective Agreements in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFOR-
MATION 216 (1939). ' 
68 LE TE!l{PS, October 21, 1939. 
69 Note, "The War and Collective Agreements in France," 72 INDUS. & LAn. INFOR• 
MATION 216 (1939). 
70 J. Off. (Nov. 2, 1939). 
676 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 55 
committee is in a much better position to deal immediately with 
all qu~stions and requests addressed to it by the various Min-
istries concerned." As was the council, however, the committee 
was to be composed of representatives from the most important 
trade organizations of workers and employers.71 
The Decree of October 27, 193972 provided that conditions of 
employment established by collective agreements in force on the 
first of September 1939, and by arbitration awards which had 
become binding by the same date, would remain in force for the 
duration of hostilities for those employers and employees in the 
trades and districts within the scope of such agreeme9-ts and 
awards. Conditions under which changes might be made in 
conditions of employment so fixed were to be specified in a sub-
sequent decree. 
The Legislative Decree of November 10, 193973 explained 
the government's policy with respect to collective agreements and 
other matters involved in the industrial sphere. The new regu-
lations introduced substantial changes in the system of collective 
agreements formerly established by the Act of June 24, 1936. 
Specifically, the decree provided for the establishment of two dif-
ferent systems, one to apply to industries and undertakings not 
involved in national defense and the other to apply to those which 
were engaged in defense work. In the former industries and 
undertakings, the terms of existing collective agreements and arbi-
tration awards could be revised either by mutual agreement be-
tween the organizations concerned or at the request of one of 
them. The procedure for revision by request of one party was 
set forth, to be supplemented by decrees. In any case, any changes 
would come into effect only after approval by the Minister of 
Labor, from whose decision there was no appeal. In addition, 
the clauses of collective agreements and arbitration awards could 
be modified by the Minister of Labor when they "appear to him 
to be incompatible with the requirements of production or labor 
output." In particular, the minister could set the wage scales for 
a given trade or district. In the latter industries and undertak-
ings, conditions of employment, whether or not specified in col-
lective agreements or arbitration awards, were frozen ("stabi-
lized") as of September I, 1939. Conditions of employment could 
11 Note, "Wartime Legislation in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 292 (1939). 
12 J. Off. (Nov. 1, 1939) No. 267, p. 12,787 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1939, France 21 (D)]. 
73 J. Off. (Nov. 16, 1939) p. 13,143; J. Off. (Nov. 22, 1939) p. 13,298. For details in 
English, see, note, "Wartime Legislation in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 292-
295 (1939). 
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be modified only by joint decision of the Minister of Labor and 
the minister directly concerned. Civil penalties were provided 
for employers who paid wages in contravention of the provisions 
of the instant decree or subsequent ministerial decisions. And a 
Decree of June I, 1940 affirmed the authority of the Minister of 
Labor to fix wages.74 
On August 16, 1940 the Vichy Regime dissolved trade union 
confederations and employer federations,75 and the act of that date 
was later implemented by a Decree of November 19, 1940, which 
"ordered dissolution of the C.G.T. and of the C.F.T.C. and of 
a somewhat ephemeral semi-Facist organization, the Confedera-
tion des Syndicats Professionels (C.S.P.F.), which had been found-
ed in 1937 in conjunction with the Parti Social Frarn;ais."76 Be-
fore the implementing decree was issued, however, the Vichy 
Regime proclaimed its "Charte du Travail," the Act of October 
4, 1941 Respecting the Social Organization of Occupations,77 by 
which free trade unions and free collective bargaining were abol-
ished. The act prohibited strikes and lockouts, 78 provided that 
"occupational activities shall be divided among a specified num-
ber of industrial or commercial families ... " organized for 
"joint management of the occupational interests of their mem-
bers of all categories" and for "collaboration ... ,"79 provided 
for the formation of local unions whose membership was com-
posed automatically of every person engaged in an occupational 
activity in the appropriate "category, area and occupation ... ,"80 
placed strict limits on the administration, functions and purposes 
of these "unions,"81 and stated rules for the formation of regional 
and national federations of unions.82 Provisions relating to organ-
ization and workings of unions and federations were later sup-
plemented by two decrees on August 28, 1942.83 
74 Stunnthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 
241 (1951). 
75 See I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1940, France 10, for text and citation. 
76 Sturmthal, "O:>llective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 236 at 
241 (1951). 
77 J. Off. (Oct. 26, 1941) No. 293, p. 4650 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1941, France 7]. 
78Act of October 4, 1941, §5. 
79 Id., §1. 
80 Id., § §9-12. 
81 Id., §§14-18. 
82 Id., §§19-22. 
83 Decrees Nos. 2134 and 2136, J. Off. (Sept. 7, 8, 1942) No. 215, p. 3070) [I.L.O., Legis. 
Ser., 1942, France 13]. The Vichy Acts of Aug. 16, 1940 and Oct. 4, 1941 were the subject 
of an ordinance promulgated by the Algiers Provisional Government on July 27, 1944 [J. 
Off. (Aug. 30, 1944) No. 72, pp. 776-777, as amended, J. Off. (Sept. 27, 1944) No. 83, pp. 
837-838 (I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1944, France 5 and 13)], which provided for the reconstitution 
of employer and employee industrial organizations and for the restoration of their property. 
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PosT-WAR LEGISLATION: PRESENT STATUS OF THE 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
On October 27, 1946, after having been approved by a refer-
endum, a new Constitution of France was promulgated.84 The 
preamble expressed principles concerning the rights of workers, 
and the body included provisions concerning the Economic Coun-
cil, the advisory arm of the French Parliament. The preamble 
reads, in part: 
"It is every man's duty to work, and every man has the 
right to obtain employment. No one's rights, as regards work 
or employment, may be impaired because of his origin, his 
opinions or his beliefs. 
"Every man may defend his rights and interests by col-
lective action and may join the union of his own choosing. 
"The right to strike is exercised within the limits of the 
regulations fixed by the law. 
"Every worker takes part, through his representatives, 
in the collective fixing of conditions of work as well as in 
the management of undertakings." 
Two months after promulgation of the new Constitution of 
the Fourth French Republic, the Act of December 23, 1946 Re-
specting Collective Labor Agreements was enacted.85 In essence, 
the act reaffirmed the principles incorporated in the Act of 1936. 
But there were several significant differences. 
First. The French Legislature felt that until the national 
economy was stabilized and peace-time production revitalized, 
wages should continue to remain in the control of the Minister 
of Labor.86 Since 1939, wage levels had been determined, not by 
free negotiation, but by governmental decree. The time had not 
yet come when· the legislature could entrust the economy to the 
effects of economic forces which had been held in abeyance for 
seven years.87 
Second. The law marked a reversal to the concept of free 
collective bargaining in that it required the minister's approval for 
all collective agreements.88 No agreement was valid or binding 
84 J. Off. (Oct. 28, 1946) p. 9166. See note, "The New French Constitution," 54 
INT. LAB. R.Ev. 364-367 (1946), for extracts from the text. 
85 J. Off. (Dec. 25, 1946) No. 301, p. 10,932; J. Off. (Jan. 5, 1947) No. 5, p. 1!18 
[I.L.O, Legis. Ser., 1946, France 15]. 
86 Part IV, Rates of Remuneration, and Part V, Transitional Provisions. 
87 A survey of wage regulations may ·be found in LABOUR-MANAGEMENT Co-OPERATION 
IN FRANCE 63-70 [I.L.O., Studies & Reports (n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. 
ss Act of December 23, 1946, §31D. 
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unless it had received such approval, and approval could be with-
drawn at the discretion of the minister on his own initiative or 
on application by an organization of employers or employees con-
cerned.89 
Third. Approval of a collective agreement by the minister . 
implied an automatic extension of the approved agreement to 
all "public undertakings or nationalized establishments which, 
owing to the nature of their work, normally come within its 
scope. "90 And an approved agreement could be extended to 
"industrial and commercial establishments of the State or to pub-
lic authorities91 by a joint Order of the Minister of Labor and 
Social Security, the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Min-
ister concerned."92 Two writers who have dealt with the Act of 
1946 have asserted that these provisions effect an automatic ex-
tension of a collective agreement to all occupations or enterprises 
within its scope. Their words have been: 
"His approval carried with it the automatic 'extension' of 
its terms to all occupations or branches of the industry with-
in the locality or limits laid down in the agreement; thus such 
agreements took on the effect of public regulation insofar as 
the non-participating parties were concerned."93 
"His approval implied at the same time the 'extension' of the 
agreements. Thus no agreement was valid unless the Min-
ister approved it; and such approval made the agreement 
automatically a public regulation for the entire occupation 
or branch of industry within the local limits laid down in the 
agreement itself. The former division of agreements into 
two classes-those with limited validity and those 'extended' to 
nonrepresented employers and employees-disappeared .... "94 
It is submitted that there is question as to whether (I) approval 
by the Minister of Labor automatically extended the terms of an 
agreement to all occupations or enterprises within its scope, and 
(2) the act has reduced "the former division of agreements" to 
89 Id., §31G. 
90 Id., §31F, ,rI. 
91 The translation of this phrase may be erroneous. The French text reads ". • • ou 
des collectivites publiques • • .," and should be translated "or of public authorities 
[bodies]." The question is important to the meaning of the section. 
92 Act of December 23, 1946, §31F, ,r2. 
93 Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 215 at 219 (1952). 
94 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 !Nnus. &: LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 
241 (1951). . 
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one undifferentiated type rather than that the act has further 
diversified collective agreements into a triad of types, namely: 
(a) approved agreements which are automatically extended to 
"public undertakings or nationalized establishments," (b) ap-
proved agreements which may be extended by order to "industrial 
and commercial establishments of the State or to [ sic, of] public 
authorities [sic, bodies]," and (c) approved agreements for which 
there are no provisions in the Act of 1946 by which extension may 
be authorized to private industrial and commercial establish-
ments and undertakings. The author has found no judicial, 
legislative or regulative decisions, nor has he found any min-
isterial memoranda which would resolve the problem so posed. 
But it does seem unlikely that the Act of 1946, characterized as 
a reconstitution of free collective bargaining, a reaffirmation of 
the legal efficacy of freely negotiated collective agreements, and 
a reversal of authoritarian concepts which were initiated three 
years after the Act of 1936 and subsequently expanded, would 
eliminate a principle which had found favor in the minds of 
labor, the legislature, the government and the employers in June 
of 1936. An interpretation of section 31F of the Act of 1946 
which precludes, by implication,95 the extension of approved 
collective agreements to all but public undertakings, nationalized 
establishments, and industrial and commercial establishments 
of the state or of public authorities, abrogates the acceptance of 
extension to all "employers and employees in the occupations and 
regions within the scope of the agreement. . . " found in section 
3Ivd of the Act of 1936, and returns the French collective agree-
ment, so far as this concept is concerned, to the strictly contractual 
basis prescribed by the Act of 1919. In any case, it may be pre-
sumed that the authors quoted above erred, insofar as the Act of 
1946, absent authoritative interpretation, does not authorize 
automatic extension to the extent that they have assumed. 
Fourth. The confusion which had previously existed with 
regard to whether employees who are not members of the em-
ployees' representative union are affected by the terms of an 
agreement binding his employer and the union was eliminated. 
The Act of 1946 provided: 
"In every establishment which falls within the scope of an 
95 This interpretation could be justified by the rule "inclusio unius est exclusio 
alterius," to eliminate from a positive or prohibitive legislative direction an event or 
circumstance which, while otherwise included under the general intent of a statutory 
provision, is excluded by virtue of its absence from a list of events or circumstances· 
specified in the statute. 
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agreement, the provisions of the said agreement shall be 
binding in respect of employment relations arising from in-
dividual or gang contracts, save where the clauses of the said 
contracts are more favourable to the employees than those of 
the agreement. "96 
Thus, an employer who is subject to the terms of a collective agree-
ment cannot bind himself to give and an employee to take, terms 
and conditions of employment less favorable than those specified 
in the collective agreement. The same result is obtained in the 
United States through the provisions of section 9 (a) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, as amended: 
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, 
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment .... " 
In France, the employer who is bound by a collective agreement 
cannot contract, within the collective agreement's occupational 
scope, for terms less favorable than those in the collective agree-
ment; in the United States, the employer who is bound by a 
collective agreement cannot contract for terms less favorable than 
those in the collective agreement because the bargaining repre-
sentative of his employees represents, by law, all the employees, 
nonunion as well as union, in the particular bargaining unit. 
In French theory the employer is bound because the act says that 
he is bound; in American theory the employer is bound because 
96 Act of December 23, 1946, §31, 1J3. The history of this problem is outlined in 
Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 215 
at 225, n. 12 (1952) where he states: 
"The 1919 Act provided that a person bound by the agreement must apply it to his 
legal relations with third parties, unless there was a specific clause to the contrary. 
"Two situations had to be considered: 
"(I) Where both employer and employee were bound by the statute: the collective 
agreement could not be abrogated by individual agreements, in sharp contrast to the 
previously existing law. 
" (2) Where only one of the parties was bound by the agreement: the party thus 
bound was presumed to have applied the agreement, unless he stipulated to the con-
trary; but if he did so he was liable in damages. 
"The system of the statute was consequently that the employer could stipulate in 
the collective agreement that he wanted to apply it only to the members of the contracting 
union. If he did so, he was free to make individual contracts with outsiders; if he failed 
to do so, he could still make valid contracts at variance with the collective agreement; 
but he was presumed not to have done so, and if he had explicitly done so, he was liable 
in damages for failure specifically to secure this right in the collective agreement. The 
1936 Act apparently made no significant change in this respect." 
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he has so contracted with all his employees through their repre-
sentatives. 
Fifth. As was the case under the Act of 1936,97 collective 
agreements could be concluded for an occupation or industry at 
the national, regional, local, or individual undertaking level.98 
However, "The Act has been designed with a view to creating 
a chronological order in respect of the conclusion of the various 
agreements; national agreements should be concluded first and 
agreements for undertakings last."99 The Act of 1936 had no 
such design. The 1946 act provided that agreements for in-
dividual establishments shall govern conditions of employment 
only within the limits allowed by national, regional or local 
agreements,100 and, in addition, that individual collective agree-
ments "shall not contain any provisions less favourable to the 
employees than those in the special local, regional or national 
agreements which apply to the establishment concerned."101 
On February 11, 1950, the most recent French act r~lating to 
collective agreements was passed by the French legislature.102 The 
Act of 1950 replaces the Act of 1946, the acts respecting concilia-
tion and arbitration of December 31, 1936 and March 4, 1938, 
and all other enactments and decrees which had been issued 
under them. With regard to its scope: 
"It applies to all private employers and employees, particular-
ly specifying industry, commerce, agriculture and related oc-
cupations, professional work,· Government departments and 
offices, domestic service, caretakers, homeworkers, and private 
associations. It d<:>es not apply to nationally owned under-
takings save to the extent that their personnel is not subject to 
special rules issued by Act or regulation; the list of nationally 
owned undertakings having such rules will be issued by de-
cree. "1os 
97 Act of June 24, 1936, §3lva. 
98 Act of December 23, 1946, Divisions II and III. For a review of the decrees which 
set forth the criteria for determinations of the representative character of industrial 
organizations for purposes of concluding national agreements, see LABOUR-MANAGEMENT 
Co-OPERATIVE IN FRANCE 71, n. 1 [I.L.O., Studies 8: Reports (n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. 
90 LABOUR-MANAGEMENT Co-OPERATION IN FRANCE 71 [I.L.O., Studies 8: Reports (n.s.) 
No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. 
100 Act of December 23, 1946, §31Q. 
101 Id., §31R. 
102 Act No. 50-205 Respecting Collective Agreements and Proceedings for the Settle-
ment of Collective Labor Disputes, J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; J. Off. (Feb. 22, 
1950) No. 46, p. 2087; (March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2823 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6]. 
103 Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3 
INDUS. 8: LAB. 290 at 291 (1950). 
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For several years immediately preceding enactment of the 
Act of 1950, pressure had increased for a return to the system 
of freely negotiated collective agreements, as incorporated in the 
Act of June 24, 1936. In 1948 and 1949, gradual increase in 
production enabled the government to remove controls over 
prices, rationing and exchange in large sectors of the economy. 
Why, the workers questioned, should controls remain over wages 
and collective agreements? Employee organizations called for the 
restoration of free wage bargaining. 
In November 1949, the government introduced a bill104 in-
tended to govern collective agreements and specify the procedures 
for settlement of collective disputes. The text of the bill was 
preceded by a memorandum in which the government explained 
why it considered either a return to the rigid scheme laid down 
by the Act of 1946 or a reversion to the pre-war system inap-
propriate: 
"The negotiation of national collective agreements sub-
ject to ministerial approval has often proved to be most cum-
brous; yet the workers ought to be enabled to conclude wage 
agreements without delay, since these constitute one of the 
essential elements in the collective agreement as a whole. . . . 
"The 1946 legislation led to the conclusion of a large num-
ber of collective agreements with widely varying scope and 
thus to an excessive diversity in conditions of employment, 
such as would no longer be compatible with the existence of 
an extensive nationalized sector and with the need for a sound 
employment policy."1 011 
The bill consisted of two parts: one related to collective agree-
ments, the other to adjustment of collective disputes by com-
pulsory conciliation and arbitration. The first part found little 
opposition, especially since it impliedly provided for the free 
determination of wages, explicitly rendered collective agreements 
valid without governmental approval, and reenacted the desir-
able features of the 1946 law. But the second part was vigorously 
opposed by the trade unions. They argued that compulsory 
arbitration procedures would derogate from the right to strike 
that had been expressly guaranteed by the new Constitution. 
And employers feared that government price and exchange con-
trols would return if compulsory arbitration, "with the pyramid 
104 No. 8444, National Assembly, Chamber of Deputies, 1949 session. Appendix to 
the minutes of the sitting of Nov. 22, 1949. 
1011 Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3 
INDUS. & LAB. 290 at 291 (1950). 
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of labor courts which the government proposal provided," were 
enacted.106 Unanimous opposition by employers' and workers' 
organizations was reflected in the Economic Council and by a 
majority of the National Assembly. The Economic Council 
pointe.d out that "Part II of the Bill relating to conciliation and 
arbitration constitutes an infringement of the right to strike, 
which figures in the Constitution, and a contradiction of the 
principle of a return to the free negotiation of agreements."107 
Parliamentary discussions resulted in compromises. 
In the text as finally enacted, the government was able to 
salvage two main controls. 
First. The Minister of Labor is able to determine, in his 
own discretion, whether collective agreements shall be extended 
to employers and employees not represented by the parties to 
the agreement.108 Extension was to be no longer automatic in 
any case. The union demand that the automatic extension pro-
visions of the Act of 1946 should persist was refused.109 
Second. A governmentally - appointed Superior Collective 
Agreements Board is to determine, by reference to a model budget, 
the minimum guaranteed wage ("minimum vital") which, when 
accepted by "Decree adopted by the Council of Ministers on the 
advice of the Minister of Labour and Social Security and the 
Minister responsible for economic affairs ... ," shall constitute 
the minimum wage for all occupations.11° In thus retaining ul-
timate control over the minimum wage, the government felt as-
sured that no general wage increase due to an increase in the 
minimum would occur. 
106 See, for summaries of the arguments against the compulsory arbitration provisions 
of the government bill, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. &: I.AB. 
REL. REv. 236 at 244 (1951), and note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes 
Procedure in France," 3 INDUS. &: I.AB. 290 at 296-297 (1950). Two pre-war works on 
French labor courts may be consulted for information as to the special judicial system 
which has existed in this field in France: Binet, "Labor Courts," 37 INT. LAB. REv. 463, 
466 (1938); and LABOR COURTS 89, French national monograph [I.L.O., Studies &: Reports, 
Ser. A (Industrial Relations) No. 40, Geneva, 1938]. 
107 Opinion of the President of the Economic Council on Bill No. 8566, National 
Assembly, Chamber of Deputies, 1949 session. Appendix to the minutes of the sitting of 
Dec. 1, 1949. 
10s Act of 1950, §3Ij. 
109 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. REv. 236 at 243 
(1951). 
110 Act of 1950, §3lx. Under a Decree of March 3, 1950, J. Off. (March 4, 1950), 
amended by a Decree of April 15, 1950, J. Off. (April 16, 1950), the seats reserved for 
the workers' and employers' representatives were distributed among the various "most 
representative" trade unions. Final membership was fixed by an Order of April 25, 1950, 
J. Off. (April 26, 1950), after the organizations entitled to be represented had notified 
the government of the names of their representatives. See note, "Collective Agreements 
in France," 4 INDUS. &: LAB. 177 at 178 (1950). 
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The Act of 1950 abandoned the "strict hierarchy"111 of the 
Act of 1946112 by which national agreements must have been 
negotiated before regional or local agreements could be con-
cluded, and by which such regional or local agreements must have 
been negotiated before agreements relating to individual estab-
lishments within the occupational or territorial scope of the prior 
agreements could be concluded. 
"Under the preceding legislation, the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers in joint session were 
required to conclude agreements at the national level, and it 
was only within the general framework thus laid down that 
regional and local agreements found their place .... "113 
However, if a national agreement has been concluded in a given 
trade or occupation, the more restricted-scope agreements are 
only able to adapt its provisions, or certain of its provisions, to 
the needs of the particular area; such restricted-scope agreements 
cannot vary the provisions of a national agreement by concur-
rence as to less favorable terms. But such agreements can contain 
new stipulations.114 
The Act of 1950 prescribes an extended list of stipulations 
which must be incorporated into national collective agreements.1111 
The subjects which have been added to the mandatory from the 
permissive category are 
(a) Employees' delegates and works committees, and the 
:financing of the social and benevolent associations man-
aged by the said committees; 
(b) Holidays with pay; 
( c) The procedure for the revision, amendment or termina-
tion of all or part of the collective agreement; 
( d) The procedure agreed upon for conciliation, accord-
ing to which collective labor disputes which may arise 
between the employers and workers bound by the agree-
ment are to be settled; 
(e) The special conditions of work for women and young 
persons in the undertakings covered by the agreement. 
And the permissive category has been expanded by the specifica-
111 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. 8: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 236 at 
243 (1951). 
112 Act of 1946, §31M, 'J3; §31Q. 
113 Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3 
INDUS. 8: LAB. 290 at 292 (1950). 
114 Act of 1950, §3li. 
1111 Id., §3lg. 
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tion of additional subjects which may, inter alia, be included in 
national agreements. 
The procedures for the adjustment of collective disputes are 
set forth in Part II of the Act of 1950.116 Under the act, every 
collective agreement must contain provisions respecting con-
tractual conciliation proceedings for the settlement of disputes.117 
Where, however, a collective dispute is not the object of an agreed 
conciliation procedure provided for in the agreement or by sup-
plemental agreement, it must be brought before a national or 
regional conciliation board of tripartite character, including 
representatives of the employers and workers in equal numbers, 
plus not more than three persons representing the public au-
thorities. Administrative regulations are authorized to provide 
for the detailed rules respecting composition, working and terri-
torial jurisdiction of the boards.118 Arbitration, after failure to 
achieve agreement by the compulsory conciliation procedures, 
is completely voluntary. Agreement to arbitrate disputes may 
be made in the collective agreement or by any supplemental or 
ad hoc agreement.119 As under the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act of 1938, the arbitrator may not decide any points other than 
those mentioned in the record of failure to achieve conciliation, 
but he may decide "those points which, being the result of events 
which take place after the said record was made, are a consequence 
of the dispute under consideration."120 And, again: 
"The arbitrator shall give decisions on the law involved, 
in points in dispute, respecting the interpretation and execu-
tion of the statutes, regulations, collective agreements or 
agreements in force. 
"The arbitrator shall give equitable decisions on other 
points in dispute, in particular when the dispute concerns 
wages or conditions of work not fixed by any statutes, regula-
tions, collective agreements or agreements in force, and on 
points in dispute respecting negotiations concerning clauses 
in collective agreements and the revision of such clauses. 
116 J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; J. Off. (Feb. 22, 1950) No. 46, p. 2087; 
(March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2823 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6]. 
117 Act of 1950, §7. 
118 Id., §8. A Decree of February 27, 1950, J. Off. (Feb. 27-28, 1950), No. 51, p. 2337; 
amended J. Off. (March 5, 1950) No. 56, p. 2523, laid down the methods of enforcement 
of these provisions concerning national and regional conciliation boards. See note, "Col-
lective Agreements in France, 4 INnus. &: LAB. 177 at 179 (1950), for a summary of the 
provisions of the decree. An English translation of the text may be found in I.L.O., 
Legis. Ser., 1950, France 2. 
119 Act of 1950, §§9, 10. 
120 Id., §11. 
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"All decisions of arbitrators must be accompanied by the 
reasons therefor. 
"No appeal may be made against such decisions, save in 
the manner provided for in Chapter IV."121 
Chapter IV establishes a Superior Court of Arbitration to hear 
appeals brought by the parties against any decision of an arbitra-
tor on grounds that the decision is ultra vires or contrary to law. 
Of whom the court is to be composed and what its procedure 
shall be are set forth in general form, with details to await 
specification by administrative regulations.122 Chapter V of Part 
II governs the execution and legal efficacy of conciliation agree-
ments and decisions of arbitration boards. And the pre-war con-
cept, that a conciliation agreement or arbitration award affect-
ing the interpretation of the clauses of a collective agreement has 
the same effect as the collective agreement itself, persists. 
In May and June 1955, two decrees were issued.123 The first 
laid down a procedure for mediation in industrial disputes which 
was intended to facilitate conclusion of collective and wage agree-
ments. The supplementary decree contained administrative reg-
ulations. The mediation procedure is resorted to on application 
by one of the parties or by order of the Minister of Labor either 
when conciliation procedures have failed to settle a dispute or, 
if both parties agree, immediately on occurrence of a dispute. 
Immediate voluntary submission is deemed unnecessary, how-
ever, if the minister decides that a dispute over wages or other 
remuneration is such that the general interest precludes the 
normal procedure. In such cases he may order immediate 
mediation. 
One final question may be pursued. Is there any duty im-
posed on French employers and employee organizations to bargain 
collectively? The answer, if we look for an express provision to 
this effect, is "No"; but if we look to the inferences which may 
be justifiably drawn from the Act of 1950, the answer must be 
"Yes." We in the United States are not so concerned with whether 
the duty may be inferred from inexplicit provisions: we have 
121Ibid. 
122 A Decree of March 15, 1950 provided for the method of enforcement of the 
statutory provisions concerning the Superior Arbitration Courts. See, note, "Collective 
Agreements in France," 4 INDUS. &: LAB. 176 at 179 (1950). 
123 May 5, 1955, No. 55-478, J. Off. (May 6, 1955) 87th Year, No. 108, p. 4493; June 
11, 1955, No. 55-784, J. Off. (June 12, 1955) 87th Year, No. 139, p. 5923. A summary of 
their provisions may be found in note, "Mediation in Industrial Disputes in France," 14 
INDUS. &: LAB. 271 (No. 6, Sept. 15, 1955). 
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sections 8 (a) (5), 8 (b) (3) and 8 (d) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended. But even without them, the duty to bar-
gain collectively could probably be deduced. French law re-
quires that all collective disputes be submitted to conciliation. 
Insofar as conciliation is but an extension of collective bargain-
ing, a direction by the French legislature that conciliation is 
mandatory amounts to the imposition of the duty to bargain. 
French law also authorizes the Minister of Labor to convene mixed 
commissions to negotiate collective agreements, either at the 
request of one of the parties or organizations concerned, or on his 
own initiative.124 "It would seem obvious that, if these commis-
sions are to fulfill their purpose, attendance and good faith partici-
pation in the negotiations would be required. However, the law is 
silent on this point and no sanctions are set forth."125 But French 
courts have never been averse to enforcing a moral duty or duty of 
conscience not granted express legal efficacy by the legislature.126 
It may be that future developments will demonstrate that the 
duty to bargain in good faith has gained sanction in the judicial 
mind.127 
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124 Act of 1950, §§31/ and 31h. 
12ti Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 215 at 220 (1952). 
126 For cases where French courts found acknowledgment of a "natural obligation" 
valid and binding, see, e.g., Compayre v. Combes, Cass. civ. (March 11, 1918) S. 1918-
1919.1.170; Franc v. Azema, App. Toulouse (Dec. 28, 1892) S. 1893.2.209; Spouses Berrier-
Drouin v. de Cambaceres, App. Paris (Nov. 8, 1892) S. 1894.2.191; Tibayrenc v. Bureau 
de Bienfaisance de Narbonne, App. Montpellier, 1892, D.P. 1894.2.15; Faure v. Rougier, 
Cour de Grenoble, 1860 [Dalloz, Jurisp. Gen. Vol. 11, Supp. "Obligations," §385, n. l]. 
127 It has been noted that voluntary action on the part of the parties in the industrial 
sphere has been less than encouraging: Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial 
Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 216 at 220 (1952); Powell, "Activities of French 
Labor Unions in 1949-51," 72 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 642 (1951). For aflirmance of 
the view that "The effects of judicial practice are more original in a branch of law such 
as labour law • • .," see Lambert, Pie, and Garraud, "The Sources and Interpretation 
of Labour Law in France," 14 INT. LAB. REv. 1 at 14-15 (1926). And, notwithstanding 
the absence of penal or civil sanctions to compel good faith bargaining in France, collec-
tive agreements have been negotiated in a number of important industries. See, e.g., 
notes: 5 INnus. &: LAB. 108 (1951) (metals); 6 id., 326 (1951) (textiles); 6 id., 373 (1951) (do-
mestics); 9 id., 246 (1953) (chemicals); 15 id., 292 (1956) (automobiles). 
